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The legal problems associated with mental incapacity have
recently been brought to the nation's attention in the trial of
John Hinckley for the attempted murder of the president. The
uproar over the jury verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
prompted a Congressional investigation into the insanity
defense.1 This troublesome relationship between an individual's
mental capacity and his legal liability has caused problems in
civil law areas as well. The courts have had particular difficulty
developing a consistent, rational, and practical approach to
mental incapacity in the law of agency.
This article explores the status of an agency when a compe-
tent principal enters into an agency relationship and thereafter
becomes mentally incapacitated.' On the one hand, does the sta-
tus of the agency depend on factors relating to the principal
such as type, length, or permanence of the incapacity? For
instance, is the status of the agency the same when a principal
lapses into a coma as it is when a conscious principal is incapaci-
tated because of a mental disease such as schizophrenia? s If in a
coma, how does the length of the coma affect the status of the
agency? Is a legal adjudication of insanity required to terminate
the agency? On the other hand, is the agency status affected by
notice to or knowledge of the agent or a third party dealing with
the agent? For instance, is the agency terminated or suspended
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western University; Ph.D., 1965, California Institute of Technology; J.D., 1976, Univer-
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1. 68 A.B.A. J. 908 (1982).
2. This paper does not deal with irrevocable agencies, i.e., those coupled with an
interest, or with master-servant relationships involved in tort liability.
3. DORLAND'S ILLusTRATED MEDICAL DICIONARY 1177 (26th ed. 1981) defines schizo-
phrenia as "[a]ny of a group of severe emotional disorders, usually of psychotic propor-
tions, characterized by misinterpretation and retreat from reality, delusions, hallucina-
tions, . .bizarre, or regressive behavior."
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if either the agent or third party is without notice or knowledge
of the principal's incapacity when they enter into a transaction
for the principal's benefit? After exploring these questions and
modifications of the basic common law rule, this article exam-
ines whether the modifications have gone far enough. Finally,
this article will suggest changes that could be made to avoid the
remaining problems.
The frequently cited general common law rule is that an
agent's authority automatically terminates upon the permanent
loss of mental capacity of the principal, irrespective of knowl-
edge or notice." This rule operates for actual as well as for
apparent authority.5 The reason given for this automatic and
immediate cessation of authority is that the principal-agent rela-
tionship is a personal one and the agent has no authority to do
anything for the principal that the principal, were he present,
could not lawfully do for himself. But does the above rule accu-
rately reflect the current status of the law or does the general
rule simply receive lip service while the courts and legislatures
create exception after exception?
Reuschlein and Gregory state that, although the general
rule is harsh, courts, with rare exception, have been reluctant to
modify it except in cases involving banks.8 However, when a
rule is harsh, exceptions are inevitably created. Story, very early,
pointed out authority for the proposition that an agency rela-
tionship could not be revoked or suspended until an adjudica-
tion of mental incompetency.9 Story, for example, cited the case
of Wallis v. Manhattan Bank,10 wherein the court held that
"lunacy of a person who has executed a power of attorney" does
not operate to revoke it, at least until the fact of his lunacy has
4. H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNER-
SHIP 86-88 (1979); W. SEAv, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 88-91 (1964).
5. H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 4, at 92; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 125 comment a (1958).
6. Davis v. Lane, 10 N.H. 156, 158 (1839); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
AGENCY 616 (5th ed. 1857); Jackson v. Hall, 139 Kan. 832, 836, 32 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1934);
Hart v. Feely, 109 F. Supp. 3, 5 (D.C.M.D. Pa. 1953).
7. H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 4, at 87-88.
8. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
9. J. STORY, supra note 6, at 616 n.12.
10. 2 Hall 495 (1829).
11. Power of attorney or letter of attorney is defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
164, 1334 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) as a written instrument authorizing another to act as his
agent or attorney.
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been properly established by an inquisition.' 1 2 Since that early
case, common law decisions and statutory modifications have led
to a number of different results concerning when the principal
becomes mentally incapacitated.
II. COMMON LAW DECISIONS
A. Principal Adjudicated Mentally Incompetent
Many decisions state that an adjudication of mental incom-
petence automatically terminates the agency without notice or
knowledge." Both the Restatement of the Law of Agency and
the Restatement (Second) agree with this proposition. 4
In the case of Powell v. Batchelor,15 however, the court
12. J. STORY, supra note 6, at 616 n.2.
13. Hart v. Feely, 109 F. Supp. 3 (D. Pa. 1953); The Emporium v. Boyle, 7 Alaska 80
(1928); Millman v. First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 198 So. 2d 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967); Joost v. Racher, 148 Ill. App. 548 (1909); Jackson v. Hall, 139 Kan. 852, 32 P.2d
1055 (1934); Harrington v. Bailey, 351 S.W. 2d 946 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Renfro v. City
of Waco, 33 S.W. 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
14. Section 122 of the Restatement states that "[t]he authority of the agent to make
the principal a party to a transaction is terminated or suspended upon the happening of
an event which deprives the principal of capacity to become a party to the transac-
tion. . . ." RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 122 (1933). While this basic statement of law is
not altogether definitive, it is followed by comment a that "[t]he principal may cease to
have capacity to make a contract or to subject himself to liability because of mental
incompetency as where there is a judicial determination of insanity or because of other
changes in conditions which, by the law of the State which controls the transaction, cre-
ate such incapacity." Id. Furthermore, illustration I of comment b states that "P autho-
rizes A to sell Blackacre for not less than $5000, the authority to continue for one year
and not to terminate on P's death or incapacity. P is adjudicated incompetent without
A's knowledge. A's authority to sell Blackacre is terminated." Id. Lastly, comment a to
Section 125 states that, "revocation of authority or the happening of an event which
terminates authority . . . except supervening lack of capacity . . . does not terminate
the apparent authority which was created by the third person's knowledge of the
agency. . . ." (emphasis added). RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 125 comment a (1933).
Thus, it is reasonable to draw the conclusion from the Restatement that an adjudi-
cation of insanity terminates all authority, actual and apparent, and notice or knowledge
to the agent or third party is irrelevant.
The Restatement (Second) is similar. It states in pertinent part, that "the loss of
capacity by the principal has the same effect upon the authority of the agent during the
period of incapacity as has the principal's death.... ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 122 (1958). Under "Death of Principal," the Restatement (Second) states that
"[t]he death of the principal terminates the authority of the agent without notice to
him .. " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 120 (1958). The illustration on P's adju-
dication of incompetency mentioned above from the Restatement is also used in the
Restatement (Second). In addition, comment a to Section 125 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) on revocation of apparent authority is essentially identical to that in the
Restatement.
15. 192 Mo. App. 67, 179 S.W. 751 (1915).
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departed from this rule. The Powell court found evidence that a
general agency had been established prior to the principal
becoming insane on February 21, 1910, and being placed under
guardianship.1 The court stated that while the acts "occurred
[on] March 10, 1910, that is, after [the principal] became insane,
• . . such insanity did not have the effect, under the circum-
stances of this case, [of] terminating [the] authority or . . .
releasing [the principal] from liability for the acts of his . . .
agent.'1 7 The court failed to provide a rationale for its holding,
but cited Hill's Executors v. Day"9 and Davis v. Lane,19 wherein
no adjudication of insanity had occurred.
Recently, in Matter of Estate of Head,2 0 a case decided on
the ground that the agency was coupled with an interest," the
court stated that "an adjudication of insanity is at most pre-
sumptive evidence of the mental capacity of a person at the time
of a transaction. The strength of the presumption is lessened in
proportion to the remoteness of the adjudication. ' 22 Thus, while
the great weight of authority holds that an adjudication of
incompetency terminates or suspends the authority of the agent
regardless of knowledge or notice, Powell and Head support the
proposition that even an adjudication may not terminate the
agency.
B. Principal Mentally Incapacitated in Fact but Not
Adjudicated Incompetent-The Restatement and
Restatement (Second) of Agency
Although the Restatement of Agency and the Restatement
(Second) of Agency are often used by courts to buttress their
decisions, neither are much help in deciding what happens to
the agent's authority when the mentally incapacitated principal
has not been adjudicated incompetent. The basic rule of law,
exemplified in section 122 of the Restatement, 3 is that the
agent's authority is terminated or suspended by an event which
deprives the principal of capacity to become a party to the rela-
16. Id. at 74, 179 S.W. at 753.
17. Id., 179 S.W. at 754.
18. 34 N.J. Eq. 150 (1881).
19. 10 N.H. 156 (1839).
20. 94 N.M. 656, 615 P.2d 271 (1980).
21. Id. at 662, 615 P.2d at 278.
22. Id. at 660, 615 P.2d at 275.
23. RTATEMENTr oF AGENCY § 122 (1933).
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tionship. However, with regard to the triggering event, comment
a to Section 122 refers only to a judicial determination of
insanity or other changes in conditions.24 Neither section 122
nor comment a makes clear what events or what other changes
cause termination or suspension of the agency. Illustration 1 fol-
lowing comment b to section 122 refers only to a judicial adjudi-
cation of insanity.2 5 Comment c to section 122 adds to the confu-
sion by stating:
Temporary incapacity. The rule stated in this Section applies
to mental incompetency only when it creates legal incapacity,
as it may do in case of mental disease. Where the incapacity is
only temporary, the authority of the agent may be merely sus-
pended. Where the principal becomes mentally incompetent
for but a short period, as where he has a delirium accompany-
ing a fever, the agent's authority is not necessarily
affected .... 26
The illustration following comment c concludes that where the
principal becomes insane for eight hours after drinking wood
alcohol, contracts made for him by his agent during that period
are valid.2
Therefore, according to the Restatement, eight hours of
insanity should not affect the agency. Perhaps eight hours were
chosen in the illustration to suggest that the agency of a sleeping
principal is unaffected. This raises a number of questions. What
happens if the mental incapacity lasts one day or one week or
one month? At what point is the authority suspended or termi-
nated? The Restatement offers no guidelines. With respect to
whether notice to, or knowledge of, the agent or a third party
affects the agency, comment b states that the agent's lack of
notice does not affect termination of the agent's power. Com-
ment b does not distinguish between situations arising before or
after an adjudication of incompetency.28
Both illustrations following comment b refer only to situa-
tions where the principal is adjudicated incompetent.29 No illus-
24. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 122 comment a (1933). See supra note 14 for the text
of the comment.
25. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 122 comment b, illustration 1 (1933). See supra note
14 for the text of the illustration.
26. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 122, comment c (1933).
27. Id. illustration 4.
28. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 122 comment b (1933).
29. Id. illustrations 1 and 2.
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trations are provided to suggest what happens to the agent's
power to bind a mentally incapacitated principal prior to an
adjudication. Furthermore, the possible prejudice to third par-
ties dealing with the agent in good faith and in ignorance of the
principal's incompetence prior to adjudication is not mentioned.
The Restatement of Agency, therefore, ignores early case law
which carved out an exception to the general rule for the protec-
tion of ignorant third parties.3 0
The Restatement (Second) of Agency is even less helpful.
The basic rule of law in subsection (1) of section 122, Incompe-
tence of Principal, provides "[e]xcept as stated in the caveat, the
loss of capacity by the principal has the same effect upon the
authority of the agent during the period of incapacity as has the
principal's death."31 Section 120, Death of Principal, states that
"[t]he death of the principal terminates the authority of the
agent without notice to him except as stated in subsections (2)
and (3) and in the caveat.
3 2
The caveat and comment a under Death of Principal point
out possible exceptions to the rule of termination without notice.
In cases dependent upon a special relation, such as trustee and
beneficiary, or in transactions with special rules such as in deal-
ings involving negotiable instruments, an exception may gov-
ern.33 Comment a discusses the possible prejudice to an unknow-
30. Drew v. Nunn, 4 Q.B.D. 661 (1879); Hill's Executor v. Day, 34 N.J. Eq. 150
(1881).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122 (1) (1957).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 120 (1) (1958). Subsections (2) and (3) refer
to the special situation of collection on a check after death and are not germane to the
argument except for being one of the few long recognized exceptions. See supra note 8
and accompanying text.
33. The caveat states that "[nlo inference is to be drawn from the rule stated in this
Section that an agent does not have power to bind the estate of a deceased principal in
transactions dependent upon a special relation between the agent and the principal, such
as trustee and beneficiary, or in transactions in which special rules are applicable, as in
dealings with negotiable instruments." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 120 caveat
(1957). Comment a after the caveat in pertinent part adds the following:
When the agent has notice of the death, there is a manifestation that this
power is terminated. Without such notice, however, both justice and expedi-
ency require that the former agent should be entitled to act as he has reason to
believe the principal wishes him to. . . . For an agent employed to do business,
the common law result presents dangers from either action or inaction. If his
principal is alive, the agent is under a duty to act, since that is what he is
employed to do. Normally, one in a position in which he has duty to act on
facts reasonably known to him is protected if he makes a reasonable mistake,
as in the case of a sheriff who mistakenly arrests a person whom he reasonably
suspects has committed a felony. If the agent reasonably believes his principal
[Vol. 7:105
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ing agent or third party and concludes that the courts have
begun to make inroads on the general rule. However, besides
these two situations, section 120 does not describe the inroads
the courts have made on the general rule and section 120 pro-
vides no guidance for application of the exceptions to the incom-
petent principal.
Neither section 122, Incompetency of Principal, the caveat
to section 122, nor the comments to these sections provide fur-
ther clarity. The comment to section 122, subsection (1), states
that "[t]o the extent to which the death of the principal termi-
nates authority without notice to the agent, the permanent loss
of capacity equally terminates it" 4 [emphasis added]. The com-
ment refers only to permanent loss of capacity and, again, the
illustration following the comment deals with an adjudication of
incompetence of the principal. Lastly, the caveat to section 122
and the comment to the caveat sum up the ambiguity of the
Restatement (Second) when they state respectively that the
Institute expressed no opinion where the principal's incapacity
is only temporary and that the matter is too amorphous for a
definitive rule."5
to be dead, he is protected if he does not act, and the same should be true
when he acts in justifiable ignorance of the death. It is true that he can con-
tract with the principal for indemnity in case he is made liable to third persons
for acting without power to bind (see § 438, comment f), but that is a precau-
tion which would seldom be taken. Further, this precaution would protect only
indirectly an innocent third person also ignorant of the death. As between the
risks to the estate and the harm to business which results from the common
law rule, the protection of business is preferable.
For these reasons the courts have begun to make inroads upon the gener-
ality of the rule, and hence it is proper to make the statements in . . .the
caveat.
Id. comment a. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 120 (1958).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122 (1) comment b (1957).
35. The caveat and comment d thereafter respectively state as follows:
The Institute expresses no opinion as to the effect of the principal's temporary
incapacity due to a mental disease.
Comment on caveat:
d.. . . So, too, a declaration by a court having jurisdiction that the principal is
insane or otherwise incompetent to act in his own affairs terminates or sus-
pends the authority of his agent. On the other hand, the agent of one who
becomes mentally incompetent to act on his own account or to appoint an
agent, does not necessarily lose authority to act for the principal. Very brief
periods of insanity caused by the temporary mental or physical illness of the
principal do not destroy the power of a previously appointed agent to act in his
behalf. Further, the mental disease causing insanity has no definite boundary
at which a person loses capacity. Thus, one may have capacity to make a will
without having capacity to conduct an intricate business transaction. Even
1983]
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While the Restatement of Agency at least is willing to offer
a guideline that a temporary insanity of eight hours should not
affect an agency, the Restatement (Second) formulates no guide-
lines where there has been no adjudication of incompetency.
This, however, has not precluded courts from using the Restate-
ment and Restatement (Second) to support their decisions
where no adjudication has occurred.
C. Conscious Principal Mentally Incapacitated in Fact but
Not Adjudicated Incompetent- Common Law Cases"'
States of mental incapacity are distinguishable. On the one
hand, there are those mentally incapacitated individuals who are
conscious and appear to be functioning normally, but who,
because of some mental disease, defect, or physical accident do
not understand the nature of a contractual transaction. On the
other hand, there are those individuals who are unconscious and
clearly cannot understand the nature of a contractual transac-
tion. In between those two extremes exist many gradations.
However, for discussion purposes, the categories are divided into
conscious and unconscious individuals.
In Wallis v. Manhattan Bank,7 the court stated that "[tihe
mere existence of lunacy never operates to revoke a power, until
the fact is judicially established by proper proceedings in Chan-
cery. . . .[T]he only rule which the court can safely adopt, is to
consider the power as subsisting and operative, until the fact of
.. .[the principal's]. . . lunacy shall be established by a proper
course of legal proceedings." 8 The view that an adjudication is
required before an agency is terminated or revoked has not been
generally followed, although the recent comatose principal
cases 9 do make the agent's acts prior to adjudication voidable
instead of void.
where there is a pronounced mental incompetency, there may be ratification of
previously executed transactions during lucid intervals. The matter is too
amorphous for a statement of a definite rule.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122 caveat and comment d (1957).
36. In some of these cases, it is unclear that the principal is conscious. Where the
facts do not indicate an unconscious principal, I have assumed that the principal was
conscious. Cases where the fact of unconsciousness is stated are discussed in subsection
D of this article.
37. 2 Hall 495 (1829).
38. Id. at 500.
39. See infra notes 75, 76, 78, 86 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 7:105
Agency and Incapacitated Principals
In Drew v. Nunn,"° a principal empowered his wife to draw
checks, and was present when the wife ordered goods from
Drew. Subsequently he became insane and was confined to an
asylum. While incapacitated, his wife ordered goods from Drew
who was ignorant of the principal's condition. When the hus-
band recovered his reason, he revoked his authority and refused
to pay. Drew sued and on appeal the court stated:
[t]he satisfactory principle to be adopted is that, where such a
change occurs as to the principal that he can no longer act for
himself, the agent who he has appointed can no longer act for
him. In the present case a great change had occurred in the
condition of the principal: he was so far afflicted with insanity
as to be disabled from acting for himself; therefore his wife
who was his agent, could no longer act for him ... her author-
ity was terminated.'
The court, however, held that the husband was liable for the
debt based on his having made representations that Drew could
rely upon until Drew had notice of the insanity.42 Two concur-
ring courts, each using slightly different reasoning, agreed that
notice was required before the defendant could escape liability.4 8
One concurring judge thought that the facts resembled the case
of a guarantee. 4 The other judge did not wish to decide whether
the wife's authority was terminated or existed until a committee
was appointed. He agreed, however, that the plaintiff was enti-
tled to act on the defendant's representations.45
Other courts have concurred with the principle in Drew that
an adjudication is not required to terminate, revoke, or suspend
the agency. Some courts have stated that the agency is termi-
nated or revoked as to all who have notice although these cases
fail to address the consequences of lack of notice. Other courts
have stated that the agency is terminated or revoked except as
to third parties who give consideration and are ignorant of the
principal's incapacity. Grounds for protection of these third par-
ties have been apparent authority and estoppel.
Hill's Executors v. Day4 6 addressed the ignorant third party
40. 4 Q.B.D. 661 (1879).
41. Id. at 666.
42. Id. at 668 (Bramwell, L.J., and Brett, L.J., separate concurrences).
43. Id. at 668-69.
44. Id. at 669 (Bramwell, L.J., concurring).
45. Id. at 669 (Brett, L.J., concurring).
46. 34 N.J. Eq. 150 (1881).
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who supplies consideration. In Hill, the principal, Mr. Hill, gave
authority to Edward Day to pledge a mortgage."' A year later,
Mr. Hill was declared of unsound mind; this declaration was
made retroactive to two years prior with the exception of some
lucid intervals.4 8 During the year before the declaration of
incompetence, the authority had been exercised. After Mr. Hill's
death, his executors sought to have a transaction set aside on
the ground of mental incapacity. The court stated that the prin-
cipal's insanity per se revoked or suspended the agent's author-
ity except where a third party had given consideration in a
transaction with the purported agent "trusting [in] an apparent
authority, and in ignorance of the principal's incapacity.
49
Thus, the court implied that mental incapacity in fact would
end the agent's authority, but that an ignorant third party who
furnished consideration could rely on an apparent authority
until knowledge or notice.
In two appellate opinions arising from Merritt v. Merritt0
the court enunciated the general rule regarding an incompetent
principal and also addressed the ignorant third party who sup-
plies consideration. In Merritt I, Hanna Merritt, while sane,
gave a power of attorney to George Merritt to execute a mort-
gage. When the execution occurred, Hanna was in poor health
and had completely lost her mind. This was known to the mort-
gagee's assignees when the mortgage was executed.5 1 The trial
court held that the lunacy did not revoke the power of attor-
ney,5 2 but the appellate court reversed and remanded.53 The
appellate court quoted at length from Davis v. Lane," a case
where the principal was unconscious85 when the transaction
occurred between the agent and the third party. The Davis court
laid down the rule that the physical event which deprives the
principal of his mind and ability to act for himself revokes or
suspends the agency, because the agent has only a derivative
47. Id. at 156-57.
48. Id. at 151.
49. Id. at 157.
50. 27 A.D. 208, 50 N.Y.S. 604 (1898); 43 A.D. 68, 59 N.Y.S. 357 (1899).
51. 27 A.D. at 209, 50 N.Y.S. at 605.
52. Id. at 210, 50 N.Y.S. at 606.
53. Id. at 211-12, 50 N.Y.S. at 608.
54. 10 N.H. 156 (1839).
55. The court in Davis does not use the word "unconscious" but uses the phrases,
"on the day of his decease,. . . when he was entirely senseless," and "was utterly insen-
sible and incapable of any volition whatever. . . ." Id. at 156-57.
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power and can do nothing that the principal could not lawfully
do were he present." The Merritt I court ignored the issue of an
uninformed third party57 until a further appeal in Merritt II. In
Merritt H, the court decided that a third party, giving consider-
ation in reliance on an apparent authority and ignorant of the
principal's incapacity, would be protected.
The court in Watkins v. Hagerty59 utilized an estoppel the-
ory to deal with the case of an incompetent principal. Whether
the principal had been adjudicated insane was unclear in Wat-
kins, although the defense was raised that the principal had
become non compos mentis before the transaction in question.60
While the principal was allegedly incompetent, the attorney in
fact, and son of the principal, executed a mortgage allegedly for
his father's benefit. After the death of the principal, the mort-
gage was foreclosed and the heirs (siblings of the attorney in
fact) resisted. The court examined whether the third party knew
of the mental condition of the principal at the time of the mort-
gage execution. 1 The court concluded that the mortgagees did
not know of the principal's mental condition, and since the
power of attorney was regular on its face, duly recorded, and
recognized in all its force by the heirs, they were estopped from
denying its validity. 2 Interestingly, the court did not consider
the power of attorney to be a representation by the principal
resulting in apparent authority until the third party had notice
of its revocation. Instead, the court relied upon an estoppel the-
ory to protect the third party who gave consideration and was
ignorant of the mental incapacity.
Finally, two cases illustrate the general rule in operation in
slightly different contexts. In Parrish v. Rigell,63 the brother of
an alleged mental incompetent brought an action to have a
guardian appointed. The brother alleged that Parrish, by fraud-
ulent practices upon the incompetent, had obtained an
unrestricted power of attorney and that the power of attorney
was void and should be surrendered." The court applied the
56. Id.
57. 27 A.D. at 213, 50 N.Y.S. at 607.
58. 43 A.D. at 72-73, 59 N.Y.S. at 360-61.
59. 104 Neb. 414, 177 N.W. 654 (1920).
60. Id. at 416, 177 N.W. at 655.
61. Id. at 419, 177 N.W. at 656.
62. Id.
63. 183 Ga. 218, 188 S.E. 15 (1936).
64. Id. at 219, 188 S.E. at 17.
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general rule that there need not be an adjudication of mental
incompetence to terminate or revoke the agency, provided that
the insanity is known and of a character that affects the exercise
of the principal's will.6 In First National Bank of Cincinnati v.
Oppenheimer,'6 the principal, after executing a new will, handed
it to his brother for delivery to the trust department of the prin-
cipal's bank. Two days later, the principal suffered a skull frac-
ture and was confined to a wheel chair. The principal had to be
restrained and could not carry on a conversation. 7 The will was
delivered after the injury. The court cited the basic rule of law
in the Restatement (Second) of Agency: "[T]he loss of capacity
by the principal has the same effect upon the authority of the
agent during the period of incapacity as has the principal's
death."'68 The court held that the agency was revoked as to all
who had notice of the fact.6 The Oppenheimer court, as in Par-
rish, did not require a judicial determination of insanity to ter-
minate or suspend the agency. This was in accord with previous
courts which had applied this rule as long as the third party had
notice. However, neither the Oppenheimer court nor the Parrish
court addressed the consequences of lack of notice to, or knowl-
edge of, the agent or third party.
Therefore, with the exception of Wallis, the courts have
consistently stated that an adjudication of incompetency is not
necessary to terminate or suspend the agency of a conscious
principal. Rather, the physical event which causes the principal's
loss of capacity triggers the termination or suspension. Courts,
however, have either qualified the general rule or made an
exception. The courts protect an unknowing agent or third party
who furnishes consideration. Further, the courts have stated
that the termination occurs when the agent or third party has
notice or knowledge of the incapacity.
D. Unconscious Principal Mentally Incapacitated in Fact
but Not Adjudicated Incompetent- Common Law Cases
Since unconscious individuals generally have lost all ability
65. Id. at 223, 188 S.E. at 19.
66. 23 Ohio Op. 2d 19, 190 N.E. 2d 70 (1963).
67. Id. at 23, 190 N.E. 2d at 74.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122, (1957).
69. 23 Ohio Op.2d at 24, 190 N.E. 2d at 75; see also Dann v. Sands, 38 A.D. 2d 661,
663, 327 N.Y.S. 2d 222, 226 (1971), appeal dismissed 30 N.Y. 2d 944, 287 N.E. 2d 387,
335 N.Y.S. 2d 696 (1972).
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to enter into contracts, one might expect decisions similar to the
cases on conscious principals. In the conscious principal cases,
the rule that the agency is terminated or suspended is based on
the reasoning that the event which deprives the principal of the
ability to act for himself revokes the agency because the agent
has only a derivative power and can do nothing that the princi-
pal, were he present, could not do himself. 70 The unconscious
principal cases through 1972 are consistent with this reasoning.
Davis v. Lane7 1 involved a principal entirely senseless and
very near death. On the day the principal died, the decedent's
wife delivered a note held by the principal against Davis to one
of the principal's creditors, Prescott. Davis paid Prescott, but
then Davis sued the decedent's estate to recover the amount of
the note on the ground that the wife lacked authority to deliver
it.72 At trial, evidence was presented that the wife had acted as
general agent for the decedent for several years prior to his
death. The jury returned a verdict for the estate. On appeal, the
court stated that the act of Providence which deprived the prin-
cipal of his mind revoked the agency which was a derivative
power and the agent could accomplish nothing that the principal
could not do were he present.73
Davis clearly followed the general rule that no adjudication
of insanity is required to revoke the agency. The Davis court did
not discuss permanence of the mental incapacity nor the issue of
notice to, or knowledge of, the agent or third parties dealing
with the agent. The court did state, however, that "it would be
preposterous . .. to hold that the principal was . . . present
. ..when he was in fact lying insensible upon his death bed,
and this fact was well known to those who undertook to act with
and for him."''7
Two later comatose principal cases, Foster v. Reiss,7 5 and In
re Berry, 7 both used reasoning nearly identical to that in Davis
to reach the same conclusion that the agency terminated upon
the principal falling into a coma. In both cases, the courts cited
the basic rule of law found in the Restatement (Second) of
70. 190 N.E. 2d at 75.
71. 10 N.H. 156 (1839).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 158.
74. Id. at 159.
75. 18 N.J. 41, 112 A.2d 553 (1955).
76. 69 Misc. 2d 397, 329 N.Y.S. 2d 915 (1972).
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Agency section 122 and comments a and b.77 The court in
neither case, however, addressed protection of unknowing agents
or third parties who rely on representations of authority. In
another comatose principal case, Clark Car Co. of New Jersey v.
Clark,75 the court agreed with the basic rule of law, but the court
precluded any exceptions when it stated that "[u]nder the
weight of federal authorities, a contract executed by the attor-
ney in fact for an insane person is absolutely void regardless of
the other party's good faith, or whether or not he had notice of
the insanity.
'79
Although the unconscious principal cases through 1972
accord with the general view that the physical event which
causes the incapacity terminates or suspends the agency, the
courts in none of these cases carve out an exception for the third
party who relies on representations of authority. Although some
courts in the conscious principal cases expressly create an excep-
tion protecting unknowing agents, the case law prior to 1972
does not expressly address that issue.
Beginning in 1977, an interesting series of comatose princi-
pal cases emerged.80 The courts in seven of these eight cases
reversed the general rule that the agency is terminated or sus-
pended automatically upon the principal lapsing into a coma.
Each case dealt with a principal who, while competent, created
either an agency orally or executed a formal power of attorney,
and who later became comatose (or semi-comatose) and died
without recovering. In none of these cases was there an adjudica-
tion of incompetency. During the period of mental incapacity,
the agent in each case, knowing of the incapacity, purchased
flower bonds.8' After the principal died, the U.S. government
77. 18 N.J. at 55, 112 A.2d at 561-62; 69 Misc. 2d at 398, 329 N.Y.S. 2d at 916-17.
See supra notes 14 and 28 and accompanying text.
78. 11 F.2d 814 (W.D. Pa. 1925).
79. Id. at 819.
80. United States v. Price, 514 F. Supp. 477 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Silver v. United
States, 498 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Ill. 1980); United States v. Manny, 463 F. Supp. 444
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Estate of Watson v. Simon, 442 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd on
other grounds 586 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1978); Campbell v. United States, 657 F.2d 1174
(U.S. Ct. Claims, 1981); United States v. Estate of Dean, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
113,358 (1980); United States v. Stanley, 80-1 U.S. TAx CAs. (CCH) 13,334 (1980);
Estate of Pfohl v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 630 (1978).
81. Flower bonds, issued by the U.S. Treasury Department, have been so named
because they bloom at the death of their owner. They carry very low interest rates and
trade well below par value, but there is a steady market for these bonds because they
may be used at par or face value for the payment of estate taxes so long as the conditions
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resisted the attempts of personal representatives in each case to
redeem the bonds at par or face value. The courts concluded in
seven of the eight cases that the principal was the owner of the
bonds at the time of his death, but the rationales given for these
holdings were not always consistent. In the eighth case, United
States v. Estate of Dean,82 the court reaches the opposite
conclusion.
In Dean, the court concluded that the bonds were not
owned by the principal at the time of her death.8 3 The opinion
lacks analysis and support. The court stated that the law of
Indiana controlled,8 and that when the agent for Dean pur-
chased the bonds, the law of Indiana did not allow for an agent's
authority to continue during the time that the principal was
physically and mentally incapacitated. 8 The Dean court, how-
ever, supplied no citations to Indiana law for this conclusion.
The court went on to say that the executors had no power to act
prior to the decedent's death, and that any ratification of the
decedent's agent's unauthorized acts by the executors did not
relate back to the time of the agent's acts done during the life-
time of the decedent." Again, however, the Dean court provided
no authority for this conclusion.
Except for the Dean court, the post 1972 courts seem to
forge a new but not fully delineated common law rule for oral or
written agencies validly created by a competent principal who
later becomes comatose. Under the new rule, when a principal
has not been adjudicated mentally incompetent, the agency is
not absolutely void but only voidable. A blend of agency and
contract principles has been used to reach this conclusion. Some
courts cite the Restatement and Restatement (Second) of
Agency for the principle that a temporary insanity does not nec-
essarily terminate or suspend the agency. Other courts refer to
contract principles for the proposition that the act or contract of
a mentally incapacitated person who has not been adjudicated
incompetent is at most voidable. References to the Restatement
of Agency characterize the coma as a temporary incapacity even
promulgated by the Treasury Department are met. United States v. Manny, 463 F.Supp.
444, 445 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
82. 80-2 U.S.TAx CAS. (CCH) 113,358 (1980).
83. Id. at 113,359.
84. Id. at 13,358.
85. Id. at 13,358-59.
86. Id. at 113,359.
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though in all cases the principal died without recovering. Refer-
ences to contract principles imply that the act of the agent is of
itself no more than the act of the principal, and if the principal
has not been adjudicated incompetent then his acts are at most
voidable.
The concept of nontermination is most completely devel-
oped in United States v. Manny,87 (Manny II). Manny H repre-
sents a consolidation of two cases, United States v. Manny,"
(Manny I), a U.S. district court case, and United States v. Stan-
ley,89 a U.S. Tax Court case. In affirming both lower court deci-
sions that the decedents were the owners of the flowers bonds at
their respective deaths, and hence, that the government was
required to redeem the bonds, the court came to the following
six important conclusions:
1. Berry was decided incorrectly when the Berry court char-
acterized the transaction of the attorney in fact as void. In
Berry, the invalidation of the transaction was based on the gen-
eral rule of agency of automatic termination or suspension. The
Manny H opinion therefore rejected the rule that the transac-
tion was void and characterized it as merely voidable.90
2. The mental incapacity of a principal who has not been
adjudicated incompetent does not deprive the agent of capacity
to act except where the incapacity of the principal is known to
be permanent from the outset. The Manny II court relied on
comment d to section 122 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency91 that the authority is not necessarily lost where the
incapacity is temporary. The court pointed out that an agent
cannot necessarily tell whether the incapacity is permanent or
temporary. The court construed the Restatement (Second) to
mean that the agent is deprived of capacity only where he knows
the incapacity of the principal is permanent from the outset;
otherwise the transactions are not void but merely voidable. The
court concluded that in Mr. Manny's case the incapacity was not
permanent even though Mr. Manny had suffered a massive
stroke on June 6, 1972 and had remained comatose until he died
twenty-one days later.92 If a massive stroke immediately fol-
87. 645 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1981).
88. 463 F.Supp. 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
89. 80-1 U.S.TAX CAS. (CCH) 13,334 (1980).
90. 645 F.2d at 168.
91. See supra note 35 for the text of comment d.
92. 645 F.2d at 165.
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lowed by a twenty-one day coma which results in death is not a
known, permanent incapacity from the outset, then very few sit-
uations will be deemed to incapacitate a principal.98 Although
the court did not expressly extend this conclusion to cases where
the principal is conscious, although mentally incapacitated, no
reason exists for not making this extension. And one may con-
clude that it would be even more difficult to establish the per-
manent incapacity of conscious principals, since today a plethora
of drugs are used routinely to restore many individuals, previ-
ously considered insane, to a reasonably normal life.9
3. The acts of an agent for the nonadjudicated, incompetent
principal are at most voidable. The Manny II court relied on an
earlier New York case, Bankers Trust Co. of Albany, N.A. v.
Martin,95 wherein the court invoked the contract principle that
a contract and a power of attorney created by a nonadjudicated
incompetent are voidable. The court specifically applied that
contract principle to the agency setting wherein a competent
principal creates a valid power of attorney and subsequently,
when the principal becomes incompetent, the agent contracts for
the principal under that power.
4. Ratification is not required since a voidable transaction is
valid unless disaffirmed. Although no citations to either agency
or contract law were given, the court must have relied on con-
tract principles since it stated that, "a voidable contract does
not require ratification to come into existence, rather it requires
disaffirmance, before its existence may be extinguished."" Rati-
fication receives a slightly different treatment under the
Restatement (Second) of Agency,97 where ratification in the
agency sense means, "affirmance by a person of a prior act which
did not bind him. . . " " Ratification is to be distinguished
from the affirmance of a voidable transaction because of fraud or
mistake, and from the affirmance of a transaction, voidable
because of partial lack of capacity."98 None of the other post
93. In United States v. Price, 514 F. Supp. 477 (S.D. Iowa 1981), a principal became
comatose upon suffering a massive stroke and died ten days later. The treating physician
in Price stated that it was impossible to say with certainty whether the patient would
recover.
94. H. KAPLAN, M.D., and B. SADOCK, M.D., MODERN SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY III
771 (3rd ed. 1981).
95. 51 A.D. 2d 411, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 1001 (1976).
96. 645 F.2d at 167.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82 (1957).
98. Id.
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1972 comatose principal cases clarifies this point. 9
5. A nonparty to such a contract cannot assert voidability
and disaffirm; this right is reserved to the mental incompetent or
his legal representative.100 The Manny II court cited Bankers
Trust,'01 and Blinn v. Schwartz,102 two New York cases in which
the courts equate a contract made by a mentally incapacitated
individual with a contract made by his attorney in fact.
6. The seller of the bonds, i.e., a third party dealing with the
agent, cannot disaffirm. The Manny II court cited Estate of
Pfohl v. Commissioner.103 The Pfohl court made the same state-
ment regarding disaffirmance as the Manny II court and cited
Atwell v. Jenkins'04 and Moore v. New York Life Ins. Co.'0 5 for
support. Atwell and Moore both dealt with contracts made by
mental incompetents rather than contracts made by their
appointed agents. In Silver v. United States,'" another of the
eight comatose principal cases, the court stated that while the
transactions of a mental incompetent are voidable, and not void,
the right of ratification or disaffirmance rests solely with the
principal once he regains competence, or with the estate, and
does not extend to the other party to the contract. The Silver
court stated in a footnote that the issue was basically one of
agency law, 0 7 but the Silver court cited Williston on Contracts
to sustain its conclusion that the transaction was at most voida-
ble. The court's only citation to agency law is to comment d in
99. See, e.g., Estate of Watson v. Simon, 442 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd
on other grounds 586 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1978) where the court states that:
Mr. Watson's illness did not operate to revoke the power of attorney . . .
[However, had the decedent recovered] there might well have been questions
about ratifying or avoiding transactions which occurred during the illness ...
[Since he] did not recover . . . his estate and executrices are the only parties
who have the power to either avoid or ratify transactions of the attorneys-in-
fact. The estate and executrices have clearly ratified the purchase ....
Id. at 1002. See also Estate of Pfohl v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 630, 635 (1978) where the
court states that: "A contract entered into by one lacking in capacity can be ratified or
disaffirmed by the incompetent party upon his regaining competency . . . or by a duly
appointed committee . . . or by the incompetent's estate after the death of the
incompetent."
100. 645 F.2d at 167.
101. 51 A.D. 2d 411, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 1001 (1976).
102. 177 N.Y. 252, 69 N.E. 542 (1904).
103. 70 T.C. 630 (1978).
104. 163 Mass. 362, 40 N.E. 178 (1895).
105. 266 N.C. 440, 146 S.E.2d 492 (1966).
106. 498 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
107. Id. at 612 n.3.
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section 122 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency which states
that the area is "amorphous" with no clearcut answers.10 8
Two important points are not addressed by the Manny II
court. The first is whether an innocent third party, ignorant of
the mental incapacity, could prevent a recovered principal or his
legally appointed representative from avoiding (disaffirming) the
transaction. None of the other seven cases address the issue;
however, the right of a third party who has no notice or knowl-
edge of the principal's incapacity to maintain the transaction is
well recognized in agency law.109 The second is whether all agen-
cies or only powers of attorney are voidable. The Manny If
court refers only to contracts and powers of attorney though
there seems to be no reason not to extend the voidability to all
agencies.
The courts preceding United States v. Price110 used only
common law principles to support their conclusions. The Price
court, however, was faced with a recently adopted "durable
power of attorney" statute which stated in effect that a written
power of attorney was exercisable during a principal's later disa-
bility if it used words indicating such an intent.1 The Price
court reasoned that the statutes were designed to extend the
effectiveness of powers of attorney and agency relationships to
avoid the rule in Iowa that death or incompetence of the princi-
pal terminates the authority of the agent, and that since the
statute was not followed, the agent's acts should have been
voided.1 12 The court, however, simply characterized the incom-
petence as temporary and stated that the statute did not apply
to situations of temporary incapacity of the principal.113 This
was a tenuous argument at best, since the statute nowhere uses
the words "permanent" or "temporary" and does not make any
distinction between the two states. 4 Whether this reasoning
will stand the test of time is questionable.
In Campbell v. United States1 the court was also faced
with a durable power of attorney statute."' Again, one might
108. Id. at 612.
109. See supra notes 40-62 and accompanying text.
110. 514 F. Supp. 477 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
111. Id. at 480 n.3; IowA CODE ANN. §§ 633.705-.706 (West Supp. 1982-83).
112. 514 F.Supp. at 480-81.
113. Id. at 481.
114. Id. at 480 n.3; IowA CODE ANN. § 633.705 (West Supp. 1982-83).
115. 657 F.2d 1174 (Ct. CI. 1981).
116. Id. at 1177-78; TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 36A (Vernon 1980).
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initially think that the statute would control the case since the
facts and the statute dealt with powers of attorney. However,
the Campbell court stated that the statute merely provided one
method by which a principal might authorize an agent to act
during periods when the principal was mentally incapacitated. 17
The court then used recent common law principles from other
comatose principal cases to decide that the agency was not void.
In effect, the court ignored the statute.
None of the courts in the comatose principal cases expressly
considered whether protection is afforded an agent who enters
into a contract for the principal without notice or knowledge of
his principal's mental incapacity. The Restatement gives no pro-
tection to an agent who acts in ignorance 18 and the Restatement
(Second) equivocates on the matter.11 9 Only the Pfohl court
referred to avoiding prejudice to the rights of third persons, but
Pfohl did not identify those third persons.120
E. Summary
In summary, the common law cases decided by using an
exception to the general rule-that the agency is automatically
terminated or suspended by the principal's mental incapacity far
outnumber those where the general rule is applied. The excep-
tions include the following three categories:
1. The very early exceptions protecting ignorant third par-
ties who justifiably rely on some apparent authority or who are
estopped from challenging the agency's validity,
2. The recent exception for comatose principals where the
agency is either characterized as voidable subject to disaffirm-
ance or ratification by a recovered principal or his legally
appointed representative, and
3. The exception where the incapacity is of a very short
duration such as that mentioned in the Restatement (Second) of
Agency. The agency is said to be unaffected.
III. STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS
In addition to the common law exceptions to the general
rule of automatic termination or suspension of the agency upon
117. 657 F.2d at 1178.
118. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
120. 70 T.C. 630, 636 (1978).
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the principal's mental incapacitation, numerous statutory excep-
tions exist. Probably the most well known and universal excep-
tion is the provision in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
relating to a bank's right to accept, pay, or collect an item until
the bank has actual knowledge of a customer's incompetence. 2 '
All fifty states have adopted Article 4 of the UCC1 22 and only six
states have adopted minor variations of Article 4. '23
Another significant statutory exception relates to the large
and growing majority of states1 24 which have adopted some form
of a durable power of attorney statute.1 25 While several states
had durable power of attorney statutes1 26 prior to promulgation
of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC),1 27 the UPC provision has
121. U.C.C. § 4-405 (1978).
122. U.C.C. § 4-405; 2A U.L.A. 185-86 (1977).
123. Id. The six states are: California, Colorado, Louisiana, Nevada, North Carolina
and Utah.
124. The author examined the statutes of each of the 50 states to determine which
had "durable power of attorney" statutes.
125. This article does not consider those statutes relating to powers of attorney
established by individuals connected with the military or listed as missing in action
whose later death is uncertain. This article considers only those power of attorney or
agency statutes where the later incapacity, or disability of the principal is involved.
126. See, e.g., VA. CoDE § 11-9.1 (1978). The statute was enacted in 1954.
127. Unif. Prob. Code §§ 5-501 and 5-502, 8 U.L.A. 555-56 (1972) (approved by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in August
1969). The provisions state:
Section 5-501. [When Power of Attorney Not Affected by Disability.]
Whenever a principal designates another his attorney in fact or agent by a
power of attorney in writing and the writing contains the words "This power of
attorney shall not be affected by disability of the principal," or "This power of
attorney shall become effective upon the disability of the principal," or similar
words showing the intent of the principal that the authority conferred shall be
exercisable notwithstanding his disability, the authority of the attorney in fact
or agent is exercisable by him as provided in the power on behalf of the princi-
pal notwithstanding later disability or incapacity of the principal at law or
later uncertainty as to whether the principal is dead or alive. All acts done by
the attorney in fact or agent pursuant to the power during any period of disa-
bility or incompetence or uncertainty as to whether the principal is dead or
alive have the same effect and inure to the benefit of and bind the principal or
his heirs, devisees and personal representative as if the principal were alive,
competent and not disabled. If a conservator thereafter is appointed for the
principal, the attorney in fact or agent, during the continuance of the appoint-
ment, shall account to the conservator rather than the principal. The conserva-
tor has the same power the principal would have had if he were not disabled or
incompetent to revoke, suspend, or terminate all or any part of the power of
attorney or agency.
Section 5-502. [Other Powers of Attorney Not Revoked Until Notice of Death
or Disability.]
(a) The death, disability, or incompetence of any principal who has exe-
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served as the model for many current state statutes.
The original UPC provision has two relevant sections, sec-
tions 5-501 and 5-502. Section 5-501 authorizes continuance of a
proper power of attorney during periods of the principal's disa-
bility or the principal's incapacity at law, even when the agent
knows of the disability or incapacity. In order for the power to
continue to exist during the principal's incapacity, the power
must be expressly stated. Only when a conservator is appointed
is the attorney in fact accountable to anyone after the principal
becomes incapacitated.""
Section 5-502 allows an attorney in fact under a nondurable
power of attorney to act validly for the principal if he does not
have actual knowledge of the principal's death, disability or
incompetence. Therefore, contrary to common law principles,
section 5-502 gives protection to an agent acting in ignorance, at
least where the agency is a power of attorney.1 2 9
Section 5-502 is ambigious as to whether a third person
dealing in good faith with the alleged agent would also be pro-
tected. Section 5-502(a), however, refers to the "attorney, agent
or other person, who, without actual knowledge of the death,
disability, or incompetence of the principal, acts in good faith
under the power of attorney. . . ." While section 5-502(b) has a
procedure for the attorney in fact to establish that he acted in
good faith without knowledge, it does not have a procedure for a
third party to establish his ignorance and good faith dealing
with the agent. 30
cuted a power of attorney in writing other than a power as described by Sec-
tion 5-501, does not revoke or terminate the agency as to the attorney in fact,
agent or other person who, without actual knowledge of the death, disability,
or incompetence of the principal, acts in good faith under the power of attor-
ney or agency. Any action so taken, unless otherwise invalid or unenforceable,
binds the principal and his heirs, devisees, and personal representatives.
(b) An affidavit, executed by the attorney in fact or agent stating that he
did not have, at the time of doing an act pursuant to the power of attorney,
actual knowledge of the revocation or termination of the power of attorney by
death, disability or incompetence, is, in the absence of fraud, conclusive proof
of the nonrevocation or nontermination of the power at that time. If the exer-
cise of the power requires execution and delivery of any instrument which is
recordable, the affidavit when authenticated for record is likewise recordable.
128. Unif. Prob. Code Commissioners' Comment to § 5-501; 8 U.L.A. 555 (1972).
129. Unif. Prob. Code Commissioners' Comment to § 5-502; 8 U.L.A. 556 (1972).
130. In the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, §§ 1-10, 8 U.L.A. 81 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as UDPOAJ a later, similar statute to the originally enacted UPC pro-
visions on durable powers of attorney, the Commissioners' comment to Section 4 states
that "[t]he discussion of the Committee. . . is intended to refer to persons who transact
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Recently, the Commission on Uniform Laws promulgated a
newer version of sections 5-501 and 5-502 of the UPC called the
Uniform Durable Powers of Attorney Act "' (UDPOA). Instead
of two sections as in the UPC, the UDPOA has ten sections.
There are, however, very few differences between the two stat-
utes. The only significant differences between the two statutes
concerning durable powers of attorney for mentally incapaci-
tated principals are found in sections 4(b) and 5 of the
UDPOA.
s32
Section 4(b) of the UDPOA does not change the UPC provi-
sion that the nondurable power of attorney is revoked only after
the "attorney in fact, agent or other person has actual
knowledge of the .. .disability or incompetence of the princi-
pal. ....",,1 The Commissioners' comment to section 4 of
UDPOA, however, does clarify the previously ambiguous phrase
"or other person. 14 The comment states that the phrase "or
other person" in section 504(b) of the UPC is intended to give
business with the attorney in fact under the authority conferred by the power. Conse-
quently, persons in this category who act in good faith and without the actual knowledge
described in the subsections are protected by the statute." Yet there is still no procedure
similar to that afforded an agent by which the third party can establish his good faith
and lack of knowledge.
131. UDPOA § 1-10, 8 U.L.A. 81 (1983). The Act was approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1979. Sections 1 to 5 of the Act
are identical to current sections 5-501 to 5-505 of the Uniform Probate Code. Those
sections of the Uniform Probate Cede were amended at the 1979 conference to conform
to the UDPOA. For purposes of analysis, the author will refer to the new sections as § 1-
10 of the UDPOA.
132. UDPOA § 4(b) and § 5 read respectively as follows:
4.(b) The disability or incapacity of a principal who has previously exe-
cuted a power of attorney that is not a durable power does not revoke or termi-
nate the agency as to the attorney in fact or other person, who, without actual
knowledge of the disability or incapacity of the principal, acts in good faith
under the power. Any action so taken, unless otherwise invalid or unenforce-
able, binds the principal and his successors in interest.
5. As to acts undertaken in good faith reliance thereon, an affidavit exe-
cuted by the attorney in fact under a power of attorney, durable or otherwise,
stating that he did not have at the time of exercise of the power actual knowl-
edge of the termination of the power by revocation or of the principal's death,
disability, or incapacity is conclusive proof of the nonrevocation or
nontermination of the power at that time. If the exercise of the power of attor-
ney requires execution and delivery of any instrument that is recordable, the
affidavit when authenticated for record is likewise recordable. This section
does not affect any provision in a power of attorney for its termination by
expiration of time or occurrence of an event other than express revocation or a
change in the principal's capacity.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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the same protection to those who transact business with the
attorney in fact as to the attorney in fact who acts in good faith
and without actual knowledge of the principal's death, disability,
or incapacity. Unfortunately, ambiguities still remain, because
the UDPOA, like the UPC, contains no procedure similar to that
afforded an agent by which a third party can establish his good
faith and lack of knowledge.
Section 5 of the UDPOA extends the affidavit procedure in
the UPC for nondurable powers to durable powers. Under the
UPC it was not clear that an attorney in fact under a durable
power could prove his lack of knowledge of the death, disability
or incapacity of the principal.'3 5 Again, the UDPOA makes no
mention of how third parties can prove their lack of knowledge
of the principal's incapacity.
At present there are forty-four states that have enacted
some form of durable power of attorney statute.' These stat-
utes may be placed in five broad categories: (a) statutes identical
with, or similar to, sections 5-501 and 5-502 of the UPC; ' 7 (b)
statutes identical with, or similar to, the UDPOA;' 85 (c) statutes
identical with, or similar to, section 5-501 of the UPC;'s9 (d)
135. UDPOA Commissioner Comment to § 5, 8 U.L.A. 86 (1983).
136. The six states for which no durable power of attorney statute exists are: Michi-
gan, Missouri, Nevada, Vermont, Wyoming and Wisconsin.
137. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 13.26.325 to .326 (1972); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5501 to -
5502 (1975); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-14-501 to -502 (1973 & Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §§
15-5-501 to -502 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 30-2-1.5-1 to .5-2 (Burns Supp. 1982); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 633.705 to .706 (West Supp. 1982-83); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-
501 to -502 (1981); MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-601 to -602 (1974); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 524.5-501 to -502 (West 1975); MISS. CODE ANN. § 87-3-13 (Supp. 1982); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 91A-5-501 to -502 (Supp. 1977); Nas. REv. STAT. §§ 30-2662 to -2663
(1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2B-8 to -9 (West Supp. 1982-83); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-
501 to -502 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-30-01 to -02 (1976); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§
1337.09 to 09.1 (page 1979 & Supp. 1982); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601 to 5602
(Purdon 1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 59-7-2.1 to -7.7 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
75-5-501 to -502 (1978); VA. CODE §§ 11-9.1 to -9.2 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
11.94.010 to .020 (Supp. 1983-84).
138. ALA. CODE § 26-1-2 (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-701 to -704 (Supp.
1981); CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 2400-2405 (West Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-610 to 617
(Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 201B, §§ 1-7 (West Supp. 1983-84).
139. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-69a (West 1981 & Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 4901 to 4905 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV.
STAT. §§ 560-.-5-501 to -502 (1976 & Supp. 1981); Ky. REv. STAT. § 386.093 (Supp. 1982);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 506:6 (Supp. 1979); N.Y. GEN. OSLIG. LAW § 5-1601 (McKinney
1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-115.1 (1976 & Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 1051
to 1056 (West Supp. 1982-83); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-13-10 (Law. Co-op Supp.
1981);T-NN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-105 (1982); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. art. 36A (Vernon 1980);
W. VA. CODE § 27-11-6 (Supp. 1982).
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statutes identical with, or similar to, section 5-502 of the UPC;1 40
and (e) statutes which state that any written power of attorney
continues during the later disability or incapacity of the princi-
pal unless the power expressly limits the period of time of its
effectiveness. 14 In other words, statutes in category (e), by con-
trast with those in categories (a)-(d), reverse the presumption of
the principal's intent and are effective upon the later disability
of the principal unless he expressly states his intent to limit or
revoke that effectiveness.
One state, South Dakota, has gone so far as to extend statu-
tory protection in all agency transactions to any party who does
not have notice of the principal's incapacity. 142 In Fischer v.
Gorman,14s a case decided under the South Dakota statute, the
principal orally authorized her maidservant to deliver some exe-
cuted deeds whenever the servant was advised that her principal
would not recover. One evening, the principal suffered a stroke
at 10:30 p.m. The principal died at 12:30 p.m. the next day. Dur-
ing the morning of the day that the principal died, while the
principal lay conscious but often incoherent, the deeds were
delivered.144 The court held that under the statute the principal
was incapacitated, and that the transfer was invalid. 45 The stat-
ute upon which the court based its decision reads in part as fol-
lows: "Unless the power of an agent is coupled with an interest
. ..it is terminated as to every person having notice thereof, by
* * ,(3) his incapacity to contract."' 46 The statute does not
require that an adjudication of incompetency occur to hold the
act of the agent invalid. This is consistent with the weight of
common law authority. An unclarified point is whether the
agent's transaction is void or voidable when the power is termi-
nated. The statute bases the termination on the principal's abil-
ity to contract. However, some contractual incapacities result in
voidable transactions and others in void transactions. The stat-
ute seems to create an exception to termination not only for
third parties but also for agents, since the statute provides that
140. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-22-7 (1970).
141. GA. CODE ANN. § 4-214.1 (1981 & Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, §
l1a-23 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3027 to 3034 (West 1952 &
Supp. 1982); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 126.407 to .413 (1981).
142. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 59-7-2 (1977).
143. 65 S.D. 453, 274 N.W. 866 (1937).
144. Id. at 456, 274 N.W. at 868.
145. Id. at 462-63, 274 N.W. at 871.
146. Id. at 458, 274 N.W. at 869.
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the agency is terminated as to every person having notice.
Although the exception is stated in the negative, it would appear
that the agency is not terminated for any person without notice
and this should include agents as well as third parties.
IV. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE AGENCY OF MENTALLY
INCAPACITATED PRINCIPALS
A. Common Law Decisions
Where a principal has been adjudicated mentally incompe-
tent the great weight of authority is that the agency is revoked
or suspended irrespective of knowledge or notice to the agent or
third party. Yet one can still argue on the basis of Head14 7 that
an adjudication of mental incompetency should only be evidence
of the incapacity of the principal and given more weight the
closer in time the adjudication is to the agent's exercise of
authority. Either position is consistent with the rationale that
the agent cannot do what the principal cannot lawfully do for
himself. The phrase gives no information itself as to when revo-
cation or suspension will occur, and the outcome of the case may
depend on how state law defines that phrase. Moreover, just as
there are states today that do not allow a minor to categorically
avoid his contracts without consequences,1 4 8 a state could decide
that justice requires even a principal adjudicated mentally
incompetent to establish at the time of the transaction that he
did not understand the nature of the dealings. Certainly the
adjudication of incompetency does not in and of itself make the
principal less capable of understanding a transaction or of con-
trolling the agent. Primarily, the adjudication serves to create a
public record of the incompetency. In these cases, it is not an
onerous burden on an agent or third party to ascertain that fact.
A telephone call to the appropriate courthouse could resolve the
question. Thus, the common law rule that the adjudication
immediately terminates the agency and is constructive notice to
all, does not place a difficult burden on the agent or third party.
The idea in Head that the adjudication should be no more than
evidence of the principal's incapacity wastes court time when
the matter has already been litigated and the complaining party
147. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
148. For instance, Oregon requires a minor who disaffirms a contract to pay for the
reasonable use of the consideration given to him. See Gaither v. Wallingford, 101 Or.
389, 200 P. 910 (1921).
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could easily have ascertained the fact of adjudication. The auto-
matic termination provides maximum protection to the incapaci-
tated principal but also precludes certain benefits since the
recovered principal or his appointed representative cannot treat
a contract as voidable. Furthermore, all protection is lost to an
unknowing agent or third party who justifiably relies and gives
consideration. That this may not be the best balance of equities
is discussed below.
The results of case law are not so consistent where the prin-
cipal is mentally incapacitated in fact but has not been adjudi-
cated incompetent. The Restatement and Restatement (Second)
use permanence of the incapacity as a test for termination of the
agency but the Restatements offer little guidance where there
has been no adjudication.1 4 9 Most of the earlier cases held that
the agency was automatically terminated or suspended on occur-
rence of the event which causes the principal's mental incapacity
in fact. Yet, even some of these cases expressly gave protection
to a third party who furnished consideration in ignorance of the
principal's incapacity.1 50 In seven of the eight post 1972 cases,
the courts gave the choice of avoidance to the principal or to his
legally appointed representative. 151
In this writer's opinion, the paramount questions are who
are the persons that need protection, and, how can protection
best be accorded without exacerbating the serious time con-
straints of the courts?15 2 In answering these questions, one need
not treat the adjudicated and nonadjudicated principals differ-
ently. The same concerns apply to both situations. For instance,
should a mentally incapacitated individual who recovers (or his
legally appointed representative if he does not) be foreclosed
from an advantageous transaction entered into by his alleged
agent or should he be able to disaffirm? Furthermore, should the
principal always be liable for the transaction until the third
party or agent has notice or knowledge of his incapacity? In the
case of a principal mentally incapacitated in fact, if one
attempts to apply the common law rule of automatic termina-
tion or suspension on the basis that the agent's authority is
derivative and the agent can do nothing that the principal could
149. See supra notes 24 and 32 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 37-60 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 72 and 92-105 and accompanying text.
152. See Burger, Isn't There a Better Way, 68 A.B.A. J. 274-75 (1982); Stanley,
Minor Dispute Resolution, 68 A.B.A. J. 62 (1982).
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not lawfully do himself were he present, one runs into all sorts of
difficulties. If the principal is asleep when the agent enters into
the transaction, is the transaction void? What if the principal is
unconscious for a few moments or a few hours or a few days? Is
the agency terminated, suspended or not affected?
One might better ask whether the principal needs protec-
tion regardless of whether he is adjudged mentally incompetent.
The mentally incapacitated principal is not like the minor or
mentally incapacitated individual who personally enters into a
contract and does not have the capacity to fully understand the
legal consequences of his actions. Rather, the principal is repre-
sented by a competent agent"'3 who should be able to protect
the principal's interests whether the principal is competent or
not. Furthermore, if the incapacitated principal (or his
appointed representative) is given the power to avoid the trans-
action, he is further protected whether or not adjudicated
incompetent.
It is not unreasonable to use the contract principles set
forth in Manny II to sustain the propositions that the agency is
voidable at most; ratification is not needed to validate the trans-
action, and only the principal or his appointed representative
may disaffirm. There is no reason that those principles cannot
be extended to adjudicated principals. The English courts have
for some time applied contract rules governing mental incapac-
ity to cases involving a principal and a third party in agency
transactions."1
The agent, according to the Restatement (Second), does not
warrant his principal's capacity and should need no protec-
tion.155 However, in this writer's opinion, in states which have
not followed the Restatement (Second), the agent should be
given protection in all agency transactions where he has no
actual knowledge. South Dakota, as has been mentioned, does
this by statute for all agency transactions but uses a "notice"
rather than an actual knowledge standard, which could afford
less protection to the agent under a constructive notice theory.
Civil Law countries, using an actual knowledge standard, pro-
vide protection to agents under all powers of attorney as does
153. We assume the agent is competent. If the agent becomes mentally incapaci-
tated, that involves different issues not dealt with here.
154. See 37 CAN. B.J. 497 (1959) and references therein.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 332 (1958).
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the UDPOA. 156
The third party who reasonably relies on the agent's alleged
authority and who gives consideration can also be afforded pro-
tection. The principal or his appointed representative should be
bound in all transactions that the agent enters into with a third
party who, without actual knowledge, justifiably relies on the
agent's authority and who gives consideration. A number of the
early common law decisions accomplished this result using con-
cepts of apparent authority or estoppel. Allowing the recovered
principal, or his legally appointed representative, the choice of
disaffirming except in the case of an unknowing agent or third
party who justifiably relies and gives consideration, affords a sig-
nificant amount of protection to the principal, the third party,
and the agent. Cases where the agent is involved in double deal-
ing can be dealt with as a violation of fiduciary duty by a recov-
ered principal or a later appointed representative.
With respect to saving court time, the Manny II test pro-
vides a reasonable solution by requiring that the incapacity be
permanent and known to be permanent from the outset before
an agent would lose all capacity to act. In cases where there has
been an adjudication of incompetency, the adjudication could be
used as a conclusive presumption of permanent incapacity. This
would avoid litigation of the principal's mental status. Where
there has been no adjudication, few cases would arise where a
known permanent incapacity could be established. 157 Therefore,
in either situation, litigation of the mental status of the princi-
pal would be reduced. Additional savings in court time could be
obtained by allowing an agent or third party who acted without
actual knowledge to prove that fact by affidavit, as provided for
in the UDPOA. 158 Court time could be saved by not allowing
disinterested nonparties'1 9 to question the principal's capacity.
156. H. CACHARD, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE, §§ 1991, 2010 (1930); UDPOA Commis-
sioners' comment to § 5, 8 U.L.A. 86 (1983).
157. See supra notes 89 and 90 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
159. Although the United States is not a party to the transaction in the "flower
bond" cases, it obviously has a financial interest in the matter. However, this is more a
question of whether the U.S. Government has standing to sue. The court in Manny II
discusses whether there is any Federal law which would allow a challenge by the U.S.
Government and concludes there is none. See 645 F.2d at 166, 168-69.
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B. Statutory Modifications
The UCC provision for banks and the durable power of
attorney statutes have undoubtedly already reduced litigation.
The UCC provision protecting banks which cash checks written
by a principal who has become mentally incapacitated is reason-
able since banks are involved in more than 35 billion of these
transactions each year.1 60 However, some protection for the prin-
cipal is lost. It seems that in these cases the smooth functioning
of banks has simply been given priority because of the great dif-
ficulty in monitoring this astronomical number of transactions.
Most durable power of attorney statutes have also probably
taken away some protection from the principal since there is no
right to avoid the transaction at least before a conservator is
appointed. However, careful drafting for the principal of the
power of attorney when the principal is competent could avoid
actual losses in most cases. Furthermore, the agent who
attempts to use the power of attorney for his own benefit after
the principal has become mentally incapacitated can be held for
a violation of his fiduciary duty.
At the same time, most durable power of attorney statutes
have done a great deal to totally avoid the question of the
mental status of the principal when a proper instrument has
been drafted. In these situations, litigation should be avoided.
These statutes can also be used to save court time and to con-
serve the assets of small estates by creating a durable power of
attorney before mental incapacity occurs. Creating a power of
attorney as opposed to petitioning for a guardianship usually
requires no court time, 61 and it is also less expensive and more
flexible. 62
But as seen in Price,'es and Campbell,64 the statutes may
not help avoid litigation of the principal's mental status in states
which still follow basic common law principles and where an oral
agency is involved or where the power is not a durable one. In
Price and Campbell, the courts relied on recent common law
160. Wall St. Journal, Oct. 26, 1982 at 31, col. 4.
161. Some states do require the power of attorney to be executed before a judge.
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58 § 1051 (West Supp. 1982-83). However, this procedure
should not be as time consuming in most cases as establishing a guardianship.
162. Muses & Pope, Estate Planning, Disability, and the Durable Power of Attor-
ney, 30 S.C.L. REV. 511, 537-38 (1979).
163. 514 F. Supp. at 477. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
164. 657 F.2d at 1174. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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exceptions established in other post 1972 "comatose principal"
cases to validate the transaction, although the reasoning used
was questionable.
States might consider adopting a durable power of attorney
statute such as those found in Illinois, Oregon, Louisiana, or
Georgia, where the attorney in fact can act during a principal's
later incapacity unless the principal expressly states otherwise.
This could be extended to all agencies. The issue of incapacity
would become irrelevant in all agency transactions, and this
would in turn save court time. Perhaps with no formal writing,
much mischief might be created by an alleged agent upon a
principal who, because of lack of capacity, could not refute the
creation of the agency. But since the burden of establishing the
agency would be on the agent and/or third party, and since the
state could use a "'clear and convincing" burden of proof test,
much of the potential litigation over establishing a questionable
agency could be avoided.
If a state does not wish to go so far for oral agencies, it
could still offer protection in these cases to agents and third par-
ties who act in ignorance of the incapacity, as does South
Dakota. The agent and/or third party would have to establish
that they acted without actual knowledge and in good faith in
order to maintain the transaction. Third parties, in order to pre-
vent avoidance, would additionally have to establish that they
justifiably relied on the agent's authority and gave considera-
tion. Justifiable reliance might consist of a series of past dealings
or some prior indication by the principal of the agency's exis-
tence. Having to satisfy these criteria would probably limit liti-
gation. Again, the use of an affidavit procedure such as that
employed in the UPC or UDPOA to establish the requirements
of lack of knowledge and good faith could also save court time.
V. CONCLUSION
The early common law rule that the agency is terminated or
suspended automatically and without notice to anyone is today
so fraught with both common law and statutory exceptions that
it can scarcely be relied upon as a rule. Even where no statutory
change has occurred, the cases are split where there has been no
adjudication of insanity. In addition, forty-four states have some
form of durable power of attorney statute, and these statutes fall
into five categories which provide various exceptions to the com-
mon law general rule.
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Where no durable power of attorney is involved, for consis-
tency in decisions, to save court time, and to afford reasonable
protection to all parties, the principles set forth in Manny II
should be adopted. Also, states should consider extending these
principles to adjudicated principals and giving the appointed
representative the power of avoidance. This power should be
subject to protection of unknowing agents and third parties who
have furnished consideration and acted in good faith as laid out
in the UPC and UDPOA. States that wish to treat the adjudica-
tion as a conclusive presumption of the principal's incapacity
should also consider affording protection to unknowing agents
and third parties.
The states which have not already done so should at a mini-
mum consider adopting the UPC or UDPOA durable power of
attorney statute with the latter preferred because it goes farther
in clarifying some inconsistencies and ambiguities in the UPC.
Other suggestions for saving court time such as using the affida-
vit procedure to establish lack of knowledge and good faith in all
agency transactions are worth consideration by the states.
The primary difference between use of the UPC or UDPOA
statute and the Manny II common law principles, as extended
to adjudicated principals, would be that under the statute, the
principal (or his appointed representative) would not have the
power of avoidance. However, protection of the principal could
be maintained under the statute through careful drafting of the
power of attorney and prosecution of errant attorneys in fact for
violation of their fiduciary duties.
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